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The expression "the fpjroblem of the Fragments" actually comes not 
from the Fragments,* but from the Concluding Unscientific Postscript.2 It 
is also this latter work that places so much overt emphasis upon 
subjectivity. The Fragments has, in fact, fallen out of favor with some 
scholars who consider it too "objective" and hence neglect it in favor of the 
Postscript where, they contend, the real substance of Kierkegaard's 
thought is to be found.3 
It is my view, however, that such claims are based upon a cursory or 
uncritical reading of the Fragments. I shall argue, in the pages which 
follow, that a careful reading will reveal that there is a discrepancy between 
the form of the work and its content. That is, I shall attempt to show that 
while Climacus, the pseudonymous author of the Fragments, claims not to 
be biased in favor of either of the two interpretations of the relation of the 
individual to the truth that he presents in that work, the "Interlude"4 
section of the Fragments implicitly subverts the pretended objectivity of 
the work as a whole. I shall argue further that this discrepancy is intended 
by Kierkegaard to indirectly communicate5 to his reader that an objective 
ISeren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments; Johannes Climacus, trans. 
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1985). 
2Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. 
Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941) 
pp. 322-46/SamIede Vaerker, ed. A. B. Drachman, J. L. Heiberg, and H. O. 
Lang (Kobenhavn: Gyldendal, 1963), pp. 6082. 
3The most ardent proponent of this view is Jeremy Walker. Walker 
makes this claim on the basis of computer analyses done on the two texts 
by Alastair McKinnon. McKinnon, however, holds a somewhat more 
moderate position. He believes that while the works are unquestionably 
related, the relation is not as strong as it has traditionally been considered 
to be. 
^Fragments, pp. 72-88/Samlede Vaerker, Vol. 6. 
5The view that indirect communication is in many ways superior to direct 
communication is developed throughout the Postscript. The references 
are too numerous to be listed here. The reader will find them listed, 
however, under the heading "Communication" in the index to the 
Postscript. 
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resolution of the question of the relation of the individual to the truth is 
impossible and that the reader must thus fall back upon the character of 
his subjective experience if he Is to have the hope of finding an answer-
and in particular, the proper answer—to this question. 
It will, of course ultimately be left to the reader to determine whether 
or not I have been successful In demonstrating what I have set out to 
demonstrate in this paper. If 1 have been successful, however, then it will 
become apparent that, contrary to the view held by some very prominent 
Kierkegaard scholars, the Fragments does not represent a departure from 
the emphasis which Kierkegaard places upon subjectivity in the Postscript 
and hence that it is as valuable a resource for determining the substance 
of Kierkegaard's thought as is this latter work. 
I 
The "(plroblem of the Fragments", as Kierkegaard refers to It, is 
expressed on the title page in the following question: 
Can a historical point of departure be given for an eternal 
consciousness; how can such a point of departure be of more than 
historical interest; can an eternal happiness be built on historical 
knowledge? 
Kierkegaard does not, however, begin the Fragments by attacking this 
problem directly, but turns instead to consideration of the question of 
whether or not the truth will admit of being learned. 
He first considers this question from the classical or "Socratic"6 
perspective. On the Socratic account, he explains, the individual is seen as 
essentially in possession of the truth, but accidentally in a state of 
forgetfulness. On this view, a teacher-i.e., an individual who would reveal 
the truth to the one who was in a state of forgetfulness-is not, in the strict 
sense, necessary. That is, on this view, anything from a teacher to the act 
of tripping over a stone could serve as an occasion to jog the individual's 
memory concerning the truth of which he is already essentially in 
possession. It is clear to Kierkegaard, however, that such an account of the 
relation of the individual to the truth deprives the point in time at which 
the individual, or learner, remembers the truth of any decisive 
*>I have put 'Socratic* in quotation marks here because there is some 
question as to whether the position that Kierkegaard attributes to Socrates 
ought actually be attributed to him. This is not an insignificant issue. It 
does not, however, have any bearing upon the thesis being advanced in 
this paper, and so I do not intend to address it here. 
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significance. On this account, the moment \0ieblikket)7 at which the truth 
is remembered becomes instantly hidden in the eternity of the truth which 
is remembered 
assimilated into it in such a way that [the learner), so to 
speak,...cannot find it, even If [he] were to look for It, because (in 
eternity] there is no Here and no There, but only a ubique el 
msquam [everywhere and nowhere).8 
On this view, the individual does not really learn the truth, but only 
remembers that he has always known it. Thus it cannot be said that when 
the individual remembers the truth, he undergoes any substantive 
transformation, like that exemplified in the transition from ignorance to 
knowledge. 
Kierkegaard then speculates that perhaps an alternative 
understanding of the relation of the individual to the truth is possible. He 
even suggests that perhaps an alternative interpretation might, in some 
way, represent an advance upon the Socratic interpretation. It is with this 
alternative interpretation that Kierkegaard is primarily concerned in the 
Fragments. On this view, the individual is seen as essentially ignorant, or 
outside of the truth, and-in contrast to the Socratic view-the only thing 
which may serve to put the individual Into the proper relation to the truth 
Is the teacher. But this teacher is presented not merely as enlightening 
the learner, but as effecting a substantive transformation of him. 
That is, Kierkegaard points out that if the learner is considered to be 
essentially ignorant or outside of the truth, then he cannot even be in 
possession of the condition for understanding it, "because the condition 
for understanding the truth is like being able to ask about it-the condition 
and the question contain the conditioned and the answer."9 Thus the 
learner, on this view, needs to be given not only the truth, but the condition 
for receiving the truth, and to be made receptive to the truth in this way 
appears to involve a qualitative transformation of the individual. 
What interests Kierkegaard about this latter interpretation is the fact 
that the point in time at which such a transformation of the learner is 
effected, is clearly of essential significance to the Individual. Thus 
7This term should not be confused with Moment. While both Oieblik and 
Moment are translated as 'moment', the former refers to an instant, or to a 
point in time, while the latter is equivalent to Hegel's Moment, which is 
more properly translated as 'stage' or 'phase'. 
8/W!.,p.l3/p.18. 
9Ibid., p. 14/ p. 19. 
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Kierkegaard speculates that if this latter interpretation is correct, then an 
advance will have been made upon Socrates. That is, an advance will have 
been made insofar as the moment, or the point in time at which the 
learner comes into possession of the truth, will have been imbued with the 
essential or decisive significance that it lacked on the Socratic account. 
II 
It is now necessary for me to depart for a moment from the text of the 
Fragments and to elucidate what I take to be Kierkegaard's objective here 
in a more direct manner. What Kierkegaard is trying to point out to his 
reader is that the Socratic Interpretation of the relation of the individual to 
the truth deprives the temporal nature of the individual's existence of any 
real significance. Or, to put it even more plainly: The Socratic 
interpretation negates the reality of the temporal aspect of human 
existence, in favor of the eternal nature of the truth. On the Socratic 
account, temporal or phenomenal events can have nothing more than 
accidental significance, thus the entire temporal or phenomenal10 aspect 
of the individual's existence Is viewed as non-essential. 
Whether or not it is proper for Kierkegaard to ascribe such a view to 
Socrates is not at issue here.11 It should be clear to the reader, however, 
that the desire to reject any claim to reality that may be made on behalf of 
the temporal or phenomenal nature of existence is one that goes back 
through classical philosophy as for as Pannenides. What Kierkegaard is 
suggesting in his Fragments is that perhaps there is a coherent 
interpretation of the relation of the individual to the truth, that would not 
commit us to rejecting the reality of time. 
Climacus-the pseudonymous author of the Fragments—contends, 
however, that he has no essential bias toward one or the other of the two 
interpretations that he presents in the Fragments. He does not-or so he 
argues—try to persuade his reader that the alternative to the Socratic 
interpretation must be correct. He contends that he is merely involved in 
a "(tjhought Iplroject"12 and that'he thus has no essential interest in the 
outcome. 
My suggestion is, however, that Kierkegaard is by no means so 
disinterested. It is my contention that there is a discrepancy between 
term 'phenomenal' is particularly appropriate here as it stems from 
the Greek <paivoueva, which refers to appearances which may, or may not, 
have correspondent reality. 
I*See note 6 above. 
1 2fW*.,p.9/ p. 15. 
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Climacus' claim to objectivity and the substantive content of the 
Fragments. I believe, further, that this discrepancy was deliberate and 
that it was designed by Kierkegaard in order to point out-albeit indirectly-
-to his reader that a truly objective or disinterested contemplation of the 
issue of the nature of one's relation to the truth is either impossible or 
necessarily inconclusive. 
Ill 
While the Fragments is divided into several sections, there is a 
fundamental division between the first and the second half of the book. In 
the first half, the problem is set up and the situation of the non-Socratic 
learner is described. Kierkegaard does not, until the very end of the book, 
explicitly identify this alternative understanding of the relation of the 
individual to the truth as the Christian understanding. This is not, 
however, a fact which Kierkegaard believed was at any point obscure to the 
reader. The "teacher", on this account, is quite clearly meant to be 
understood by the reader to be Christ. 
Immediately preceding the section of the Fragments which divides 
the book into its two conceptual halves, is a section entitled 'The 
Contemporary Follower."13 This section describes the situation of the 
individual who is contemporary with Christ. After this section-though not 
immediately after, as we shall presently see—is a section entitled The 
Follower at Second Hand"14 which describes the situation of the individual 
who lives some time after the death of Christ, either immediately after or a 
number of years after, with the emphasis placed upon the situation of the 
individual who lives approximately eighteen hundred years later. 
Between these two sections Kierkegaard inserts a brief meditation on 
an apparently unrelated philosophical Issue. This section is entitled the 
Interlude" and Kierkegaard asserts that it is there to divert briefly the 
attention of the reader, from consideration of the problem of the 
Fragments, with some light entertainment. He explains that in a play, 
when one desires to represent the passage of time between acts, an 
analogous tactic is often employed. In such instances, he continues "...the 
orchestra sometimes plays a symphony15 or something similar in order to 
1 3iWa., pp. 555-71/ pp.53-66. 
uIbid., pp. 89-110/ pp. 81-98. 
Danish term here is "e Symphoni". The rendering of this word in 
English as 'symphony' is rather unfortunate insofar as it is slightly 
misleading. 'En Symphoni' in nineteenth century Danish could mean 
anything from a large orchestra piece to the more modest compositions 
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shorten the time by filling it up."16 Thus he explains that he has decided to 
fill in the eighteen hundred years that intervene between the follower who 
is contemporary with Christ and the nineteenth century follower, by 
pondering, briefly, the question of whether the past can be considered to 
be more necessary than the future, or whether the possible, by becoming 
actual, becomes more necessary than it was. 
Now I have arrived at the point where my thesis finally begins to take 
shape. My contention is that the question with which the "Interlude" is 
concerned is by no means unrelated to the problem of the Fragments. If 
this does not seem a particularly novel suggestion, I shall go even further 
and argue that not only is the question of the "Interlude" significantly 
related to the problem of the Fragments, but that it deliberately subverts 
the pretended objectivity of the work. To accept what is said in the 
"Interlude", I shall argue, is to express a definite preference for the 
alternative to the Socratic understanding of the relation of the individual 
to the truth. If the reader approaches the Interlude*' with an open mind 
on the question of which interpretation of the relation of the individual to 
the truth is correct, he cannot, 1 shall argue, leave the "Interlude" similarly 
open minded. That is not to say that the "Interlude" will attract every 
reader to the Christian interpretation of existence, but rather that if the 
reader is not so attracted, then the "Interlude" will serve to actively repel 
him. 
The problem with the "Interlude" Is that is assumes what Kierkegaard 
contends, in the Fragments, he has set out to investigate or to prove. That 
Is, Kierkegaard begins the Fragments with the question of whether it is 
possible to make an advance upon Socrates by imbuing the moment 
[0ieblikket] with essential or decisive significance. To put is more plainly: 
Kierkegaard sets out to determine if there is a way to interpret the relation 
of the individual to the truth that will make the temporal nature of an 
individual's existence an essential or decisive aspect of that existence. 
The Socratic interpretation of the relation of the individual to the truth 
reduces the temporal aspect of human existence to something of only 
accidental significance, and so to preserve substantial significance for the 
temporal nature of existence, an alternative interpretation of the relation 
that were commonly played between the acts of plays. It appears, in fact, 
that the latter usage was more common, during this period, than the 
former. There is thus no reason to suppose-as indeed I did when I was 
first developing the thesis being advanced in this paper—that 
Kierkegaard's use of "en Symphonf here is intended to be ironic. I am 
indebted to Bruce Kirmmse for the above information. 
1 6Ita*.,p.71/p.67. 
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of the individual to the truth is needed. Kierkegaard thus offers such an 
alternative to see if it will, in fact, make an advance upon Socrates by 
preserving the reality of time. We shall see, however, that the thesis of the 
"Interlude"—i.e., that the actual is no more necessary than the possible, or 
that nothing comes into existence through necessity-implicitly assumes 
the reality of time. 
IV 
The view which Kierkegaard ascribes to Socrates is very pervasive among 
philosophers. It reaches back through the history of philosophy at least as 
far as Parmenides. Parmenides contends that either a thing is, and then it 
is impossible for it not to be (tyizv onoos eonv TE Ktxi cos ovte ecm \u\ eivm), 
or it is not [r\ 6 cos OUK ecmvj.17 That is, either a thing exists or it does not, 
but it is impossible, on Parmenides view, to consider that something could 
exist at one moment that did not exist in the previous moment. Hence, for 
Parmedides, nothing can be understood to come into existence. What is 
true, or what is real, on this view, is what is "uncreated and imperishable".18 
Reality is considered to be timeless and unchanging. Consider the 
following fragment: 
It never was nor will be, since it is now, all together, one, 
continuous. For what birth will you seek for it? How and whence 
did it grow? I shall not allow you to say nor to think from not 
being: for it is not to be said nor thought that it is not; and what 
need would have driven it (to be) later rather than earlier, 
beginning from nothing, to grow? Thus it must either be 
completely or not at all. Nor will the force of conviction allow 
anything besides it to come to be ever from not being. Therefore 
Justice has never loosed her fetters to allow it to come to be or to 
perish, but holds it fast. And the decision about these things lies 
in this: it is or it is not...[f]or if it comes into being, it is not: nor is it 
if it is ever going to be In the future. Thus coming to be is 
extinguished and perishing is unheard of.1 9 
1 7 G . S. Kirk, J . E. Raven, M. Schofield, Presocratic Philosophers 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 245. 
*8I&i<f., p. 248. The Greek here is: ayEvnTOt) and ovQyyeOpov. 
1 9 m , pp. 249-50. 
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Kierkegaard acknowledges that the contention that something can 
come into existence is problematic, since it appears to commit one to the 
view that something comes to exist from nothing, but he attempts to 
escape this problem with the contention that there is a difference between 
absolute non-being and the non-being which represents potential being. 
Kierkegaard contends that 
this non-being [Ikke-Vaeren] that is abandoned by that which 
comes into existence must also exist.... But such a being 
[Vaeren]20 that nevertheless is non-being is possibility 
[Muligheden), and a being that is being is indeed actual being 
[virkelige Vaeren) or actuality [Virkeligheden) and the change of 
coming into existence is the transition from possibility to 
actuality.21 
Thus Kierkegaard escapes the charge of trying to get something from 
nothing by contending that possibility is a kind of non-being that, in fact, 
differs from the non-being which is purely nothing. But Kierkegaard is still 
not in the position of having made an advance upon Socrates (or upon 
Parmenides), because it may be argued—as Indeed Parmenides would 
argue-that what comes into existence, in fact, exists already in the form of 
possibility, and that the change is thus merely in the appearance of the 
thing and not in its essential being or reality. 
The difficultly here hinges upon how one understands the term 
'possible'. Aristotle considers that there are at least two senses of the term, 
and that in one sense it is appropriate to speak of the necessary as being, 
or as having been, possible-indeed, it would seem self-contradictory to 
speak of the necessary as being, or as having been, impossible. On this 
view, one can speak of a particular historical event as having been at one 
point possible and at the next point having become actual, and yet all the 
while understanding the event as having been necessary. This is precisely 
what Kierkegaard wants to avoid, because such talk makes the 
phenomenon of the coming into existence of a particular event something 
2 0 The definite articles in Danish are enclitic. "En" is the common gender 
definitive article, hence it would appear that Vaeren and Muligheden 
ought properly to be translated as "the being" and "the possibility" 
respectively. The definite articles are sometimes used, however, with 
abstract nouns such as vaeren or doden: 'death'. (N.B. Nouns were 
capitalized in Danish during Kierkegaard's lifetime. They are no longer 
capitalized however.) 
^Fragments, pp. 73-74/Samlede Vaerker, Vol. 6, p. 68. 
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of merely accidental rather than essential significance. That is, on this 
view the event may appear to be possible or it may appear to be actual, but 
the form of its appearance becomes insignificant, for insofar as it is 
understood to be necessary, then it must be understood to exist even when 
it appears to be merely possible. It exists in the sense that even when it is 
in the state of possibility or potentiality, insofar as it is understood as 
necessary, It negates the possibility of any other event or course of events, 
a negation which is normally understood to be effected only through the 
actualization of a particular event. 
It is thus a matter of indifference, on this view, whether a particular 
event appears to be possible, or has already been actualized. But it is 
precisely this indifference to the change of coming into existence which 
Kierkegaard desires to overcome. 
In his attempt to avoid the possibility of such an Indifference, 
Kierkegaard goes back to examine whether it is proper to consider that 
possibility can be predicated of the necessary. He argues that the 
necessary cannot come into existence, or cannot be understood as having 
been possible, because "(doming into existence is a change, [and] since 
the necessary is always related to itself and is related to itself in the same 
way, it cannot be changed at all."22 But if nothing can come into existence 
through necessity, then everything must come into existence through 
freedom. Thus Kierkegaard contends that everything which comes into 
existence—which is to say all historical events-comes into existence 
through freedom and not through necessity. 
On this view, an event would not be said to exist in the form of 
possibility, rather It would be said that possibility existed. But to say that 
possibility exists is to say that at that point any number of different events 
could be actualized. It is in this way that Kierkegaard hopes to make the 
reader understand the change of coming into existence as one of essential 
significance and thus persuade the reader that it is not a process to which 
he should be indifferent. 
V 
Although Kierkegaard offers an argument for the views he expresses in 
the "Interlude", the argument is by no means conclusive. It would appear 
entirely possible for the Parmenidean to reject the view that the transition 
from possibility to actuality constitutes a real change. Kierkegaard argues 
that the necessary cannot come into existence because coming into 
existence is a change and the necessary cannot change. But if one 
Vlbidvp.n/ p. 68. 
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subscribes to the Aristotelian sense of 'possible', then one may argue that 
coming into existence does not constitute a change in any significant or 
substantial sense. 
Kierkegaard's rejection of Aristotle's view that possibility may be 
predicated of the necessary seems to stem from the intuition that this is 
not what we normally mean when we use the term 'possible', but in feet 
constitutes a perversion of the normal meaning. But even if Kierkegaard's 
intuition is correct, it may be that our language simple fails to provide us 
with an adequate description of reality. It may not be legitimate to 
conclude from the feet that we understand or use the term 'possible' in a 
particular way, that this tells us something about the true character of 
existence. It may be that, in feet, nothing is possible in the sense in which 
we most often use the term. 
The effect that what is said in the "Interlude" has upon the Fragments 
as a whole is clear. The problem of the Fragments, it will be remembered, 
is the question of whether it is possible for there to be a historical point of 
departure for an eternal consciousness. The truth is considered eternal; 
thus it is the nature of the relation of the individual to the truth that 
becomes the decisive factor in how the question is to be answered. 
Insofar as the truth is eternal, consciousness of the truth constitutes, 
on Kierkegaard's view, "eternal consciousness" [evig Bevidslhed]. The 
question is: How does the individual come into possession of the eternal 
consciousness? On the Socratic view, the individual is seen as essentially 
in possession of it, but accidentally in a state of forgetfulness. If it seems 
peculiar to contend that one can be conscious of something one has, in 
fact, forgotten, it should be remembered, however, that the emphasis here 
is on 'essentially' and 'accidentally'. The point in time at which the Socratic 
individual remembers the truth does not represent the point at which he 
comes into possession of the consciousness of the truth, rather, it marks 
the point at which he realizes that he has always know the truth. Thus it 
does not seem possible, on this view, to speak of anything more than an 
apparent point of departure for the eternal consciousness of the truth, 
insofar as the individual is understood as actually having been in 
possession of this consciousness all the time. 
As soon as the individual becomes aware that he has always known the 
truth, he is unable to find the point in time which would normally be 
understood to have marked his transition from a state of ignorance to a 
state of knowledge. Thus the point in time at which the individual 
remembers the truth-and, in fact, the entire changing face of temporal 
existence-can have nothing more than accidental significance over and 
against the etemality of the consciousness of which the individual is in 
possession. 
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Climacus contends that he has, at least in principle, no problem with 
this interpretation of the relation of the individual to the truth, but that he 
Is merely setting out, in the Fragments, to investigate the issue of whether 
or not there is an alternative interpretation that would preserve essential 
or decisive significance for the temporal aspect of human existence. 
I have already examined the nature of the alternative Climacus offers. 
He contends that what he is doing in developing such an alternative is 
merely offering a project for thought. This project, he says "indisputably 
goes beyond the Socratic, as is apparent at every point. (But] (w)hether It is 
therefore more true than the Socratic is an altogether different question".23 
Climacus claims that he has offered, in the Fragments, a disinterested or 
objective account of what he considers is an exhaustive treatment of the 
ways in which the individual can be understood to be related to the truth. 
We can see now, however, that what Kierkegaard offers in the Fragments 
is by no means as disinterested or objective account as Climachus 
pretends. 
I stated, in section II of this paper, that while Climacus offers the 
"Interlude" as a piece of light entertainment to distract the reader from 
consideration of the problem of the Fragments, the question with which 
the "Interlude" is concerned is by no means unrelated to the problem of 
the Fragments. If one accepts what is said in the "Interlude" concerning 
the nature of the transition from possibility to actuality-which is to say, if 
one rejects the Aristotelian sense in which possibility may be predicated of 
the necessary-then one is committed to the view that the temporal aspect 
of human existence is of essential or decisive significance. We have seen, 
however, that the Socratic interpretation of the relation of the individual to 
the truth deprives temporality of such significance. Thus it would appear 
that if one accepts what is said In the "Interlude", one is precluded from 
accepting the Socratic interpretation of existence. 
The question is: Why would Kierkegaard deliberately subvert the 
objectivity of the Fragments in this way? This is not an easy question to 
answer, but I have worked out a modest theory concerning this apparently 
perverse action of Kierkegaard's, and I shall offer it to the judgement of 
the reader in the pages which follow. 
^ZWtf., p. 111/ p. 99. 
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VI 
The disjunction Kierkegaard posits between the Socratic and the 
Christian interpretations of the relation of the individual to the truth, in 
fact represents what he would contend is the disjunction between the 
traditional philosophical understanding of the relation of the individual to 
the truth-an understanding that, again, goes back as far as Parmenides-
and the Christian understanding of that relation. 
The traditional philosophical position is that all that is required in 
order for the individual to come to know the truth is the possession of the 
faculty of reason or of understanding. As the possession of this faculty is 
considered, more or less, universal among human beings, this position is 
not, in any significant respect, distinguished from what Kierkegaard 
identifies as the "Socratic" position. To possess this faculty i s , in essence, 
to possess the truth. That is, if all that is required in order for an individual 
to come to understand the truth is the ability to reason, then insofar as 
every human being is considered to be capable of such an activity, if a 
particular individual fails to come to understand the truth, this failure 
must be viewed as a phenomenon of merely accidental significance; for on 
this view, the individual must be understood to have been essentially 
capable of coming to understand the truth, even if he accidentally failed to 
realize this potential. 
Thus what Kierkegaard has done in the Fragments is contrast what he 
considers is the philosophical interpretation of existence with the Christian 
interpretation. The irony is that the work purports to be an objective 
juxtaposition of these two interpretations when, in fact, it is not. The reader 
may wonder why Kierkegaard would so carefully, and indeed artfully, 
create in the Fragments the discrepancy identified above between the 
works appearance—i.e., its pretended objectivity-and its actual bias. It is 
my view that the answer to this question lies, not surprisingly, in his views 
concerning indirect communication. Kierkegaard contends that: 
the secret of all communication consists precisely in 
emancipating the recipient, and that for this reason (one] must 
not communicate himself directly; aye, that it is even irreligious to 
do so. This last holds true the more subjective is the essence of 
the matter, and hence applies first and foremost in the religious 
sphere.24 
^Postscript, p. 69/Samlede Vaerker, Vol. 9., p. 64. 
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It is my contention, as I stated at the beginning of this essay, that 
Kierkegaard believes that it is not possible to resolve the debate between 
the Socratic, or the traditional philosophical interpretation of existence 
and the Christian interpretation, through a purely objective consideration 
of the two positions. Indeed, it is my contention that Kierkegaard does not 
believe that an objective consideration of the issue is even possible. 
I believe that Kierkegaard is using the "Interlude" to make an implicit 
appeal to what he hopes is the individual's subjective experience of 
freedom. That is, it appears that he is hoping to appeal, through the 
medium of the "Interlude", to the individual's subjective impression that 
the choices which punctuate his existence are real and that he thus has a 
substantive role in the formation of the character of his existence. I 
believe that Kierkegaard's objective, in making such an appeal, is to reveal 
indirectly to the reader that the philosophical interpretation of existence 
fails to preserve any essential or substantive significance for this 
impression of freedom. 
I contended above that if the "Interlude" did not serve to sway the 
reader in the direction of the Christian interpretation of existence, then it 
would alienate him even further. The logic behind this contention should 
now be clear. Insofar as the "Interlude" is understood here to represent 
Kierkegaard's indirect appeal to the character of the reader's subjective 
experience, if that experience does not seem to the reader to be one of 
freedom, but rather of necessity,25 then the "Interlude" will simply drive 
him further away from the Christian interpretation of existence and toward 
the Socratlc/philosophical one.2 6 Kierkegaard's views on the nature of 
2!>My temptation is to consider that such a perception of freedom (or of 
the substantial significance of individual choices) that was described 
above, is a universal characteristic of human experience. One of my 
colleagues has informed me, however, that his experience is precisely the 
opposite. He claims that his impression is that his choices are not really of 
substantial significance. That is, he claims that his impression is that his 
choices are, in fact, determined by the "kind of person" he is. 
26The reader should resist the temptation to consider that Kierkegaard 
subscribed to a relativistic position that would consider the Christian 
interpretation of existence to be true from the individual whose subjective 
experience had the requisite character, but not true for the individual 
whose experience was of a different nature. Kierkegaard was no relativist. 
My suspicion is that he would not have considered the subjective 
experience of necessity—with the exception of the experience of an 
apostle, which exception is of no concern to us here-to be authentic, but 
would have considered it rather to be a symptom of a diseased spirit. The 
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communication commit him to the position that to state his belief on this 
matter in a direct manner would be less effective than presenting it in a 
manner that appeared antithetical to the content of the belief itself.27 It 
would certainly have been possible for Kierkegaard to have stated the 
thesis that an objective resolution of the debate between philosophy and 
Christianity was impossible. Such a presentation would, however, by no 
means compel the reader to accept the thesis. Thus it would seem that 
Kierkegaard practically orders his reader to try to resolve this debate in an 
objective fashion, precisely in order to help the individual to understand 
that such an objective resolution is Impossible. 
Conclusion 
If the interpretation of Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments and in 
particular, the interpretation of the significance of the "Interlude" section 
of the Fragments, provided above is correct, then it is clear that the 
content of the Fragments, in contrast to its form, Is quite consistent with the 
emphasis that is placed upon subjectivity in the Postscript and that it is 
thus as valuable a resource for determining the substance of 
Kierkegaard's thought as this latter work. 
Fragments need not, however, be considered to be aimed exclusively at 
those readers whose spirits were in a sufficient state of health. For, as 
Kierkegaard points out, it is sometimes necessary to take "measures to 
disclose the sickness." The Sickness Unto Death, trans. Howard V. Hong 
and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19801, p. 23/82. 
In this instance, the disease of the spirit would be disclosed by the 
reluctance of the individual to acknowledge the reality of time. For while 
Kierkegaard would probably find such a position acceptable for a pre-
Christian thinker, it is not a view that he would And acceptable for a 
nineteenth century Christian-or indeed, a Christian of any century—for it 
is his view that such a position runs counter to the basic tenets of 
Christianity. Hence part of the objective of the Fragments is probably to 
expose the disease, or hypocrisy, of giving lip-service to the freedom of the 
human will, while simultaneously subscribing to a more fundamental 
metaphysical position which would preclude the existence of such 
freedom. 
2^See note 5 above. Much of Kierkegaard's position concerning the 
nature of communication is also contained, however, in the discussions 
concerning the relation between the teacher and the learner, which occur 
in the Fragments and Johannes Climacus. 
THE PROBLEM WITH THE FRAGMENTS S7 
It Is, however, always open to the reader to consider that Kierkegaard 
is unaware of the precise theoretical significance of the "Interlude" and in 
particular of the consequences which the adoption of the position 
contained therein has in relation to the question with which the Fragments 
is primarily concerned-i.e., the question of the nature of the relation of the 
Individual to the truth. But if this is the position one desires to maintain, 
then one is left with the burden of establishing alternative motivation for 
Kierkegaard's insertion of the "Interlude" in the Fragments. The 
substance of the "Interlude" clearly precludes the responsible reader from 
an uncritical acceptance of Climacus' contention that it is not his belief 
that the "matter" with which the "Interlude" is concerned "definitely 
require"[s)"2S the consideration of the reader. It is quite clear that, despite 
Climacus' protests to the contrary, Kierkegaard is accusing the reader of 
"not fully understanding (himlself in this regard."29 But if the Fragments is 
intended by Kierkegaard to be an objective examination of the relation of 
the individual to the truth, why is the failure of the reader to understand 
himself, in any respect, important? 
I believe that the interpretation of the Fragments presented in this 
essay provides the least contrived, or most coherent, account of the 
significance of the "Interlude" and .hence of the Fragments more 
generally, as it is perhaps possible to offer. If this seems a contentious 
claim (and it very likely is), it should be taken by the reader as a challenge 
to provide a yet more coherent or persuasive interpretation of this work of 
Kierkegaard's that is, I believe, one of the richest of resources for 
determining the substance of his thought. 
^Fragments, p. 73/Samlede Vaerker, Vol. 6, p. 67. 
29Jftaf„p.73/p.67. 
